

18 February 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. George Carver, Special Assistant for  
Vietnam Affairs, Office of the DCI

SUBJECT : Reminder Concerning Your Lecture for  
Operations Course Phase II [redacted]

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1. This memorandum is intended to remind you of your agreement to speak to the students of the Phase II Course [redacted] on Wednesday, 25 February, from 1000-1200 hours, and to refresh your memory concerning some of the items we would like you to discuss.

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2. As we have done in the past, a half dozen or so students will join us for lunch in the private dining room.

3. You will be the keynote speaker for this cycle of Phase II and will also be the only speaker of that day. (We have Ambassador Douglas Henderson and Mr. Justin O'Donnell scheduled for that Friday.) The substance of your past lectures for us on "The Role of the Agency in Internal Defense Programs" is still just what we want, so please plan to structure it essentially the same way. You will remember, too, that [redacted] and three or four other experts on Vietnam will compose themselves into a panel as they did last fall and present a day-long recap of the Agency's role in Vietnam. This will be a week after your talk.

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4. With that in mind, and using Vietnam as a springboard to describe and relate the broader considerations, the following are among the items we would like you to cover again:

a. Given the nature of the tremendous commitment the U. S. developed in the Vietnam war and the demands it made upon the Agency's personnel and materiel resources, what innovations and new "chartered" responsibilities have or will become part of the Agency's role in the coming years as it faces internal security crises elsewhere.

b. What lessons have we learned from the Vietnam experience regarding the real utility of rural development and pacification programs in an underdeveloped country faced with an insurgency threat? How and when must the concepts be applied to assure an effective impact; when might they be useless appendages and some other technique deemed more appropriate?

c. There has been some talk in Washington circles that no one existing government agency can adequately meet the demands of a full-ranging counterinsurgency or internal security commitment to a foreign country and that a new agency, perhaps an affiliate of DOD, ought to be created for such a purpose. Is this valid or do you think the Agency can fulfill the task should another Vietnam-type crisis appear.

d. Whenever the Agency gets involved in some uniquely non-espionage sort of activity (i.e. developing cottage industries in a nation-building context), the explanation usually is that there was an urgent need that such be done and that AID or some other appropriate agency could not gear itself up quickly enough to meet the need or the deadline. Is this jack-of-all-trades capability likely to be strengthened in the Agency in coming years or will we divest ourselves of such as much as possible?

e. In the eyes of the White House and State, what sort of grades has the Agency achieved in its efforts to develop and support viable internal security programs in crisis areas? Where have we fallen short and in what ways? What must be done to improve our capability? (This can be manipulated into a brief pep talk for the students, if you so choose.)

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Deputy Chief  
Operations Training, Staff II

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